We investigate all listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock Exchanges on extreme market movement days over 2010 to 2017, and highlight the important role of price limit on post extreme day stock returns. Utilising daily cash flow data of the largest trading group as a proxy of institutional investors trading behaviour, we identify institutional investors' consistently destabilizing effects on extreme days across two markets. We further show the upper (lower) price limit hitting stocks continue to increase (decrease) for at least two subsequent days, and find evidence of long run price reversal for lower hitting stocks. Finally we find the greater net buy by large traders the higher abnormal return in three subsequent days of the upper price limit hitting regular stocks, while the net sell on extreme days tend to predict the positive subsequent abnormal returns.
Introduction
The recent Chinese stock market turbulence over 2015 to 2016 has attracted attention from global investors who are seeking benefits from international risk sharing and portfolio diversification. Specific questions of interest are: Who drives to the abnormal stock returns in these extreme days? What's the pattern of stock returns on post extreme days, particularly for stocks hitting the price limit? Could the post extreme day stock return be predicted by trading activities involved in the extreme day? The answers to those questions are important since it contributes to a better understanding of Chinese equity markets.
In order to identify the sources of extreme swings, current studies examine the trading behaviour of institutional investors by using quarterly institutional ownership data as the proxy for institutional trading on extreme movement days in U.S. stock market (Dennis and Strickland, 2002) and Chinese stock market (Tian et al., 2018) . Dennis and Strickland (2002) are the first to investigate on extreme days in U.S. stock market, and find firm's abnormal return on these days is associated with percentage of institutional ownership. Unlike Dennis and Strickland (2002) , Tian et al. (2018) documents a stabilizing effect of institutional ownership on firm's abnormal returns in China's stock market.
However, the quarterly horizon of institutional holding conceals important details about the undisclosed short-term activities, see in Campbell, et al. (2009) and Boehmer and Kelley (2009) among others.
Therefore, it is vital to explore other appropriate measure of institutional trading through which the extreme market swings could be better explained. Following Dennis and Strickland (2002) , we define extreme market days as the large movement days when the absolute market return exceeds three or two standard deviation above its mean. As cash flow plays important role in explaining stock returns 1 , we use a more appropriate proxy for institutional daily trading, i.e. the daily cash flow data collected from RESSET database. Similar to the Chen et al. (2019) , we first acquire cash flow data of the largest group where the cash inflow and outflow of each transaction are above one million Chinese RMB. According to the distribution of market value held by retail investors 2 , it is reasonable to assume most transactions by largest group is initiated by institutional investors. We then investigate the impact of large trading on extreme day return and find i) the large traders are net buyer (seller) on extreme up (down) days; ii) a consistent and significant evidence that the large traders, mostly comprised by institutional investors, play a destabilizing role on stock abnormal returns, however, they tends to reduce abnormal turnover on extreme down days.
Furthermore, an ignored fact in extreme market swings in Chinese stock markets is that substantial stocks hit upper (lower) price limit 3 on up (down) extreme movement days 4 . Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine post extreme day stock return, particularly for stock hitting the price limit, during extreme market swings. This paper identifies the source of extreme movement days by using daily trading data in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets respectively from 2010 to 2017, followed by an extensive investigation on post extreme day price-limit-hitting stock returns over different horizons.
In our post extreme day study, we are particularly interested in the returns of stocks hitting price limit (i.e. ±10% limit hitting for regular stocks and ±5% limit hitting for special treatment (ST) stocks) on extreme days, given that the findings of whether price limit leads to delayed price discovery or price reversal effect in China's stock market is mixed (Chen, et al., 2004; Wong et al. 2009 and Li, et al., 2014 , Chen, et al., 2019 . Following Chen et al. (2019) while setting the subsequent returns over different horizon from overnight up to 120 days, we find that i) the returns of post extreme days consistently continue to increase (decrease) at least two subsequent days for regular stocks hitting 10% (-10%) price limit. The finding contrasts with Chen et al. (2019) who find a significantly moderate price reversal on subsequent first day in term of open-to-close return, indicating that the price limit plays a more pronounced role of delayed price discovery after extreme days; ii) there is long run price reversal evidence for lower hitting sample in extreme down days but not upper hitting sample in up days; and iii) Similar moderate patterns can be found for ST stocks.
Using a similar set-up proposed by Chen et al. (2019) , we also investigate whether the net buying (selling) of large trading investors on up (down) extreme days predict the stronger delayed price discovery return. Interestingly, we find significant evidence of predictive power of net buying (selling) on returns of near subsequent days in two stock markets, the power of which is more marked for regular stocks. In sum, large trading behaviour by large investors, dominated by institutions, not only exacerbates the volatile market, but also impacts on the returns on post extreme days.
This paper contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, we use the daily cash flow data by largest trading group, as dominated by institutional investors, as the proxy for institutional trading. We find large investors have a consistently destabilizing effect on extreme market swings in most cases except for extreme down days where the abnormal turnover has been reduced. Unlike Tian et al. (2018) , our finding indicates that the quarterly institutional ownership data is less likely to capture the short-term institutional trading activity.
Second, we highlight the importance of price limit effect on extreme market swings and identify determinants of post extreme day performance particularly for price limit hitting samples. We further provide strong evidence of continuous increase (decrease) after extreme up (down) days for upper (lower) price limit hitting sample.
Third, we present evidence that the net buy (sell) by large traders has strong predictive power on post extreme day returns, reflecting institutional investors not only exacerbates the volatile markets but affects the post extreme day performances particularly for price limit hitting stocks as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the extant literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and measures of variables. Section 4 introduces the methodology and Section 5 presents key findings. Finally Section 6 concludes. All extreme days in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market and the analysis of ST stocks can be accessed in Appendix A and B respectively.
Literature review and hypotheses development 2.1 Extreme days
Cash flow has been well documented as an important factor in explaining stock returns. Kirchler et al. (2015) examine the impact of cash and trader inflow on price efficiency with a novel multi-period experimental asset market setting, and find the joint inflow of cash and traders triggers strong overreaction and price run-ups. In a laboratory asset market research, Razena et al. (2017) show that market exhibits bubbles and crashes when is associated with cash flow and long trading horizon. et al. (2012) find the investors flows of international funds has significant price impact in emerging markets, thereby resulting in their return co-movement. They also find that the flowperformance relation of fund plays a destabilizing positive-feedback effect on the underlying markets.
Jotikasthira
By using data of fund flow, Jiang and Yuksel (2017) examine the flow-performance relation for full sample of U.S. domestic equity mutual funds, and document a significantly positive relation between fund flow and subsequent fund performance. In another words, funds with net inflow outperform funds with net outflow for the subsequent one month.
In a more recent study focusing on Chinese stock market, Yang and Yang (2019) develop cash flow inflow-outflow imbalance index by using individual stock cash flow data of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2015 from RESSET database, and find that the inflow-outflow imbalance index is important in explaining stock excess return. However, the trading of investors by different size may have different effect on stock returns. Similar to Chen et al. (2019) , we focus on large traders, as dominated by institutional investors in China, as they tend to be more sophisticated investors and likely to have larger impact on the stock returns on extreme days. According to the retail investors' holding value information in China, the cash flow data by largest investor acts as the compelling proxy for daily institutional trading in our study, which makes it possible to investigate the institutional investors trading behaviour on extreme days on daily frequency.
The trading behaviour of institutional and individual investors in stock market has attracted much attention in financial literature. Two well-documented trading behaviours of institutional investors are herding, which refers to following other institutional investors to buy (sell), and positive feedback trading, which refers to buying past winners and selling past losers (Lakonishok et al., 1992 , Nofsinger and Sias, 1999 , Sias, 2004 . However, the evidence of whether institutional investor stabilizes or destabilizes the stock market in literature remains mixed. Lakonishok et al. (1992) show the destabilizing market effect from funds herding and positive-feedback trading behaviour, and Dennis and Stricklands (2002) demonstrate a destabilizing effect of institutional trading behaviour in large market movement days as well. While others find that the trading behaviour by institutional investors help stabilize the stock market by speeding the price-adjustment process (Wermers, 1999) , reducing stock price volatility (Li and Wong, 2010) and alleviating the abnormal returns in market swings (Lipson and Puckett, 2010; Tian, et al. 2018 ). Dennis and Strickland (2002) investigate the relationship between the stock returns and ownership structure in volatile markets when absolute value of market return is two percent or more in U.S. stock market from 1988 to 1996. They find the firm's abnormal return and abnormal turnover on these days are significantly related to its institutional ownership. Using the institutional ownership as the proxy for institutional trading, they suggest that institutional investors play a destabilizing role in the large movement days due to the positive feedback herding behaviour. A more recent research by Tian et al. 
Post extreme days

Post extreme day performance
A notable characteristic in China's stock market is that substantial listed shares hit the price limit on large movement days. In an extreme down day of 24 August, 2015, for an example, 87.4% listed A-shares in Shanghai Stock Exchange hit the lower price limit. Therefore it is important to analyse the delayed price discovery effect that prevent prices from efficiently reaching their equilibrium level post extreme days (Kim and Rhee, 1997).
Price limit rule has been popular in emerging market where stock market trading is dominated by retail investors, as it helps cool off the market and gives investors a time-out period on large movement days.
However, the question of whether the stock will continue to rise (fall) after upper (lower) price limit hit in China's stock market is mixed in literature. Chen et al. (2004) Contrary to Chen et al. (2005) and Wong et al. (2009) , they report the effectiveness of price limit in preventing price continuation. A more recent research by Chen et al. (2019) documents the destructive market behaviour of price limit, using the account-level data from Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the period from 2012 to 2015. They find the stock price continues to increase on the next day after upper limit hitting and eventually reverses over the long-run. Despite the number of price hit samples becomes larger in the extreme market days relative to normal trading days, the effectiveness of price limit on extreme market days remains unexplored question. We thus test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. The price of regular (ST) stocks continue to increase or decrease in near subsequent days after price limit hitting of ±10% (±5%) on extreme market days and eventually reverses in the long run.
Post extreme day return and large trading
Few studies examine the predictive power of trading behaviour on stock returns of following days. Chen et al. (2019) is the first in examining the predictive power of large investors on stock's subsequent returns over the different horizons from day 1 to day 120 relative to the days of price limit hitting. They find the evidence of stronger price reversal in post upper limit-hitting days when the net buying by large investors in limit-hitting days is greater, which is explained by that institutional investor is likely to conduct pump-and-dump strategy where push stocks to price limit to arouse the attention of other investors and sell it on the next day.
In order to examine whether the large trading, mostly initiated by institutional investors, in extreme days has the predictive power to post extreme day return, we then test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The large trading on extreme day has the predictive power to post extreme day return and the power is more pronounced for the price limit-hitting regular stock on extreme day. Finally, the cash flow data is sourced from RESSET (www.resset.cn) database. 
Data and measurement of variables
Extreme days
Key variables
Large trading data
We obtain daily cash flow data of all listed A-shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from RESSET database, which classifies all individual buy-initiated and sell-initiated trading transaction into four categories based on the trading amount level of each transaction, which are i) less than 50 thousand RMB; ii) between 50 and 300 thousand RMB; iii) between 300 thousand and 1 million RMB and iv) bigger than 1 million RMB. Ware particularly interested in the trading behaviour in the last group, because the trading of which is mostly dominated by institutional investor. According to retail investors' holding value data from China Securities Depository & Clearing Corporation Limited, the percentage of retail accounts whose stock holding market value exceeding 1 million in 2011 and 2016 are only 0.82% and 2.75% respectively. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the trading in last group in mostly contributed by institutional investor. As such, similar to Chen et al. (2019) , the key variables we define, for the proxies for daily institutional trading, are i) NETBUY, defined as the net cash inflow of the group where the amount of each transaction is above 1 million RMB and ii) NETSELL, as the negative value of NETBUY, defined as the net cash outflow of the group where the amount of each transaction is above 1 million RMB. NETBUY and NETSELL have been scaled by the number of stock's total tradable shares.
Dependent variables
Extreme day
Consistent with Dennis and Strickland (2002) and Tian et al. (2018) , we examine the performance of all listed A-shares on extreme day by abnormal return and abnormal turnover. Abnormal return is computed from the market model estimated from the time horizon from 250 to 50 prior to the extreme days (hereafter, [-250, -50] ). Abnormal turnover is the difference between turnover on extreme days and the median turnover upon [-250, -50] . Turnover is represented as the trading volume on extreme day scaled by the total tradable shares outstanding.
Post extreme day
We also examine performance of listed A-share on post extreme day, and particularly the shares hitting price limit on extreme day is our core interest. 
Control variables
In accordance with the prior extreme day studies (Dennis and Strickland, 2002 and Tian, et al. 2018 ),
we include a set of control variables as i) SIZE, which is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 50 days prior to the extreme day; ii) TURNOVER, which is daily volume expressed as a percentage of shares outstanding on extreme day; iii) VARIANCE, which is market model residual variance for days [-250,-50] and iv) BETA, which is computed using returns for days [-250,-50] for the Shanghai or Shenzhen Composite index.
The inclusion of size is to ensure the relationship between abnormal return and shareholder composition or large trading is not driven by size. This is due to i) institutional investors prefer to invest in large firms (e.g. Lakonishok et al., 1992) ; and ii) firm size is documented as the risk factor (Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1993) . Turnover ratio is included for the liquid factor as institutional investors are documented to prefer liquid stocks (Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001) . Variance is stock idiosyncratic risk and proxies for information asymmetries. Relative to retail investor, institutional investors are document as informed investor (e.g. Wermers, 2000; Li and Wang, 2010) and the institutional holding is expected to be negatively related to information asymmetry. The inclusion of stock variance is to alleviate the concerns that institutional investors may be averse to invest in stocks with lower idiosyncratic stocks (Falkenstein, 1996) . Beta is included also for another proxy for firm risk. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of key variables used in extreme days of Shanghai and Shenzhen market when the absolute market return is two standard deviation above mean. And extreme days are separated into up or down extreme days according to whether market return is positive or negative.
Descriptive statistics
We observe 38740 firm-day observations in Shanghai up extreme days, which is less than 45411 firmday observations in Shanghai down extreme days, indicating a significant asymmetry distribution of extreme days in Shanghai stock market. The distribution becomes more asymmetry toward downside in Shenzhen stock market, in which 45411 firm-day observations included in up days, which is much less than 76972 firm-day observations in down days.
The sign of NETBUY and NETSELL is one of our core interests in this study, as it reflects the trading Regarding the discernible differences in four control variables in our study between two markets, table 1 reports the statistics of larger size of listed shared, less turnover, variance and beta in Shanghai stock market relative to Shenzhen stock market. 
Methodology
Extreme day
Our main hypothesis in extreme day study is that institutional investors exacerbate the volatile market.
Given that the quarterly ownership data does not reflect well the clear pattern of institutional trading on extreme day (Campbell, et al. 2009; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009) , we follow the set-up by Dennis and Strickland (2002) and use daily trading data to test the effect institutional trading on firm performance on extreme days across two stock markets. We also measure the firm performance in extreme days by abnormal return and abnormal turnover.
Abnormal return
According to the insights provided by table 1 that large trader tend to conduct net buying trades in up extreme days and net selling trades in down extreme days, we further use NETBUY and NETSELL in up and down extreme days respectively to investigate the Hypothesis 1 that the firm performance on extreme day is associated with the large amount trading, as predominately initiated by institutional investors. We then run the following regressions in up extreme day using Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach:
where, is the abnormal returns of firm i in extreme days; is the net buy value of large amount trading scaled by number of total tradable shares outstanding for firm i. All other variables are defined as earlier.
where, is the abnormal returns of firm i in extreme days; All other variables are defined as earlier.
We then run the regression above in down extreme days using NETSELL variable.
where, is the abnormal returns of firm i in extreme days; is the net buying of large amount trading (each sell-initiated transaction above 1 million RMB) scaled by number of total tradable shares outstanding for firm i. All other variables are defined as earlier.
Post extreme day
Performance of post extreme day
In order to test the hypothesis that whether return of price limit hitting shares continue to rise (fall) on days subsequent to extreme days (Hypothesis 2). Similar to Chen et al. (2019) , we test the abnormal returns subsequent to hitting the upper or lower price limit and other key inner price range in extreme days. The time horizon for post extreme day returns is extended to 120 days relative to extreme days.
We decompose the first day return into i) CTO (i.e. overnight return), which refers to the return calculated from the close price in extreme day and the open price in the following day and ii) OTC, which refers to the return calculated from the open and close price on the following day relative to extreme day. We also test the cumulative abnormal return over time horizon of [6, 10] , [11, 20] , [21, 60] and [61, 120] relative to extreme day. Due to the different price limit level, we further separate the stocks into regular and ST stocks.
Post extreme day return and large trading
We proceed to investigate whether the net buy (net sell) of the largest trading investors on upper (lower)
price-limit-hitting stock has predictive power for the subsequent price reversal (Hypothesis 3). Despite
we would like to consistently use the technique of Fama-MacBeth (1973) where uses the time-series average of cross-sectional coefficients to make the inference, the different time horizon between net buy (net sell) on extreme day and subsequent (cumulative) abnormal return creates problem. Therefore, similar to Chen et al. (2019) , we pool stock-day observations in our extreme up or down sample based on Shanghai or Shenzhen stock market. The samples of regular and ST stocks in regression are separated due to their different levels on price limit. We demonstrate the methodology of analysis on regular stocks as below and the methodology of ST stocks can be accessed in Appendix B.
The regression of regular stocks in extreme up days is specified as follows:
, 
where, , + → + is the dependent variable, referring to the market-adjusted abnormal returns on day 1,2,3,4,5 and cumulative abnormal returns over days [6, 10] , [11, 20] , [21, 60] and [61, 120] for stock i after up extreme day t.
, is dummy variable and equals to one if the stock i on event t hits the up price limit. , , , and , are also dummies, referring to inner price range for stock i in extreme day t over 8% to 9.99%, 6% to 7.99% and 4% to 5.99%. All other variables are defined same as earlier.
The coefficient on the interaction term between UPPER and NETBUY is our core interest in the study.
The positive coefficient of 3 translates Hypothesis 3, indicating the stronger price delayed effect after upper-price-limit hits with greater net buy of large trading investors in up extreme days.
The regression of regular stocks in extreme down days is specified as follows: {1,2,3,4,5,10,20,60,120} (6) where, , + → + is the dependent variable, referring to the market-adjusted abnormal returns on day 1,2,3,4,5 and cumulative abnormal returns over days [6, 10] , [11, 20] , [21, 60] and [61, 120] for stock i after up extreme day t.
, is dummy variable and equals to one if the stock i on event t hits the lower price limit. , , , and , are also dummies, referring to inner price range for stock i in extreme day t over -9.99% to -8 %, -7.99% to -6 % and -5.99% to -4%. All other variables are defined as earlier.
The coefficient on the interaction term between LOWER and NETSELL is our core interest in the study.
The positive coefficient of 3 translates Hypothesis 3, indicating the stronger price delayed effect after lower-price-limit hits with greater net buy of large trading investors in down extreme days. Table 1 contains results in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market respectively from separately estimating Eq. (1), (2), (3) and (4) for extreme up and down days using Fama-MacBeth (1973) technique over the years from 2010 to 2017. We focus on large amount trading, as mostly initiated by institutional investors, and its impact on stock abnormal returns and abnormal turnover in extreme market days.
Findings
Extreme day
Abnormal returns
To be more specific, we are particularly interested in the impact of net buy (sell) by the large investors on stock return on extreme up (down) extreme days in China's stock market. Column (1) and (3) ((2) and (4)) in table 2 present the relationship between stock abnormal return and net buy (sell) in extreme up (down) days in two stock exchanges. Our previous descriptive statistics suggest, on average, large traders perform the positive net buy and net sell trading behaviour in up and down extreme days respectively. In table 2, the coefficient of net buy of large trading investors is positively (negatively) significant at 1% in both two stock markets, suggesting a destabilizing effect of large traders on stock returns on extreme movement days. Moe specifically, the coefficient of NETBUY (NETSELL) in Shanghai stock market is 1.898 (-2.809), which corresponds to an increase (decrease) of approximately 1.9% (2.8%) in stock returns for a 1% increase of share, in total tradable shares outstanding, by net buy (sell) from large trading investors on up (down) extreme days. The destabilizing effect of large trading investors become more pronounced in Shenzhen stock market. Overall, our finding suggests that the large traders, predominated by institutional investors, play an evident destabilizing effect on China's extreme days, which is contrary to the indication of stabilizing effect of institutional ownership (Tian et al., 2018) . We highlight the importance of distinguishing the impacts between quarterly institutional ownership and daily institutional trading on stock return in extreme days, because quarterly changes in ownership do not provide a clear picture of the trading patterns of institutions since quarterly horizon can mask important details about their undisclosed short-term activities (Campbell, et al., 2009, Boehmer and Kelley, 2009 ). (1), (2), (3) and (4) by using Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. The dependent variables are stock abnormal return (AR) on extreme day, calculated from market model over [-250, -50] ; and abnormal turnover (ATURN), calculated from difference between turnover on extreme days and the median turnover upon [-250, -50] . The key variables are NETBUY and NETSELL, referring to the net buy and sell by large investors on extreme days. All other variables are same as defined earlier. 
Abnormal turnovers
Column (5), (6), (7) and (8) Chen et al. (2019) , we also compare the price limit hitting samples with stocks, the closing returns of which falls into different key ranges (e.g.
9% to 10%, 8% to 9%). We further separate i) regular stocks and ST stocks in each table due to their different limit of price hitting; and ii) up and down extreme days in each tables. Consistently, the abnormal return is calculated from market model over days [-250, -50] relative to each extreme day.
Regular stocks
With respect to the first subsequent day performance for regular stocks in Shanghai up extreme days, the first row of Panel A in Table 3 reports the close-to-open (CTO) return on average is 2.64% (significant at 1% level), and continue to increase during the first day's trading hours by average 1.52% (significant at 1% level), which contrasts with the finding by Chen et al. (2019) that a small amount of price reversal is found in first day's close price relative to open price in all days' investigation over 2012 to 2015. Our result indicates a more pronounced continuous price increase in the first subsequent day relative extreme days for up price limit hitting stocks. Further, the price continues to rise on average 1.78% (significant at 1% level) in the second subsequent day for upper price limit hitting stocks on extreme up days, and a significant pattern of price reverse is found in day 3 and day 4. However, there is no consistent evidence of price reverse in the long run. When in comparison with the post extreme day performance of large returns (without up limit hitting) on extreme up days, in general, a significant price reverse is found in the three subsequent days relative to extreme days, which differs evidently with the price limit hitting samples, indicating the important role of price limit plays on the post extreme day performance.
In the extreme down markets in Shanghai stock market, the last row in Panel B shows the price pattern following lower-limit hits. [61, 120] for lower price limit hitting sample on down extreme day is 1.86% (significant at 1% level). In comparison to price limit samples, the stock prices of other large inner range drop more moderate than lower price limit hitting samples in near subsequent days, reflecting the important continuous price decreasing effect of lower price limit.
Overall, the continue increase (decrease) of price pattern in subsequent days is observed in up (down) days for upper (lower) price limit hitting samples in SHSE. Further, a long-run price reversal is observed in lower price limit samples, but not in upper price limit samples. The price pattern of stocks in SZSE is consistent with SHSE.
ST stocks
The findings of ST stocks can be accessed in Appendix B. Panel A (Panel B) in Table B-1 and Table   B -2 demonstrate the price pattern for ST stocks. The upper limit hitting ST stocks exhibit continue price increase pattern in SZSE but not in SHSE. Further, there is no long run price reversal detected for upper hitting ST stock in both two markets.
With respect to the price pattern of ST stocks in extreme down days, however, a significant continuous price decrease is found in both two markets. In other words, the lower hitting ST stocks drops significantly at CTO, followed by a moderate small price reversal at OTC, and keeps significant downward price drop for at least four subsequent days. A small long run price reverse of 0.99% (significant at 1% level) is found for ST stocks in SZSE but not SHSE.
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Post extreme day return and large trading
Regular stocks
Panel A and Panel B in Table 5 (Table 6 ) report the regression analysis of Eq. (5) and (6) for regular stocks in Shanghai (Shenzhen) extreme up and down days respectively.
For regular stocks in up extreme days (Panel A in Table 5 and Table 6 ), the coefficients of our key interest, as of the interaction term UPPER*NETBUY, are consistently positive over the three subsequent days relative to extreme days in two stock market, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3 that stronger price continuous increase after upper price limit hits with larger net buy of large traders, mostly as initiated by institutional investors. Specifically, the coefficient of UPPER*NETBUY in first subsequent day relative to Shanghai (Shenzhen) extreme up day is 0.468 (1.413), corresponding to that, on average, the increase of one percentage of net buy by large traders on Shanghai (Shenzhen) extreme up day will lead to approximately an increase of 0.468% (1.413%) abnormal return on the first subsequent day for upper price limit hitting stock.
Our finding contrast with Chen et al. (2019) where the negative coefficient of interaction term is found for full samples over 2012 to 2015, reflecting the fact that the net buy by large traders not only exacerbate the abnormal return in extreme days, but also contribute to higher returns in near subsequent days for stocks hitting upper price limit. Such patterns are not found in the stock with large inner stock return in extreme days, which further highlight the distinctive price movement patterns for price limit hitting stock. Furthermore, the coefficient of NETBUY also translates the predictive power on stock returns on subsequent days. The coefficients of NETBUY in SZSE are significantly negative over the four following days, though the significance is only found in the second following day in SHZE. The finding indicates the predictive power of NETBUY on price reversal of near subsequent days, particularly in Shenzhen stock market.
For regular stocks in down extreme days (Panel B in Table 5 and Table 6 ), the coefficients of interaction term LOWER*NETSELL are significantly positive in subsequent three days relative to extreme days in SZSE, indicating the stronger price reversal in near following days for stocks hitting lower price limit on extreme days, with the increase of NETSELL. In Shanghai stock market, however, the similar patterns are not identified. Nonetheless, the coefficient of NETSELL in SHSE in the first following day is 0.167 and significant at 1% level, translating an average increase of 0.167% abnormal stock return in first subsequent day with the increase of one percentage of net buy by large traders. All these positive coefficients associated with NETSELL in two stock exchanges indicate that the net sell on extreme down days, largely due to panic selling, predict the positive returns on the near subsequent days.
ST stocks
In Appendix B., Panel A and Panel B in Table B-3 (Table -4 Shanghai up extreme days, we also find the significantly positive coefficients of NETBUY in subsequent two days relative to extreme days, which is supportive to the predictive power of NETBUY on returns for ST stocks hitting 5% price limit. More specifically, one percentage increase of NETBUY will lead to an average increase of return with 0.607% on first day following Shanghai up extreme days.
The coefficients of interaction term, however, are mostly insignificant.
On down extreme days, the positive coefficient of interaction term LFIVE*NETSELL on first subsequent day in Shanghai stock market suggests that the price reversal is stronger for ST stocks hitting the down price limit with the increase of NETSELL on Shanghai extreme day. However, the similar pattern does not exist on Shenzhen stock market. In sum, the predictive power of net buy or net sell in extreme days on subsequent days is more moderate for ST stocks compared to regular stocks. 
Robustness check
Similar to Dennis and Strickland (2002) , we also define the extreme days as the absolute market return exceeding three standard deviations above mean. As such, we have 13 up and 24 down extreme days in SHSE, and 4 up and 25 down extreme days in SZSE. Our robustness checks do not include Shenzhen up days due to the lack of extreme day samples. Overall, the results of robustness check are quantitatively and qualitatively similar.
Conclusion
Utilizing the company level data of all listed stocks in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2010 to 2017, we investigate the impact of large trading, mostly initiated by institutional investors, on firm performance during extreme movement days. The post extreme day returns for price limit hitting stocks have been further examined, through which we find large trading on extreme day has significantly predictive power regarding to post extreme day returns. Price limit plays an important role for delayed price discovery on extreme days, and the trading behaviour by large investors not only exacerbates the volatile market, but also impacts on the returns on post extreme days, particularly for the price limit hitting samples.
In our extreme day study, we obtain the daily cash flow data for the largest trading group, as mostly traded by institutional investors. Our descriptive statistics suggest that on average, the large traders perform net buy (sell) behaviour on extreme up (down) days in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock Exchanges.
We then investigate the impact of large trading, as a proxy for institutional trading, on firm performance on extreme days. We find significantly strong evidence that the trading initiated by large investors exacerbates the volatile stock market, which contrasts with Tian et al. (2018) , suggesting that institutional ownership data used in prior extreme day study do not provide the clear institutional daily trading pattern. In the down extreme days, however, the net sell by large investors tend to decrease the abnormal turnover.
In post extreme day study, we find the post extreme day stock return consistently continues to increase (decrease) for at least two subsequent days for regular stocks hitting 10% (-10%) price limit, which is contrast to Chen et al. (2019) who claim a significantly moderate price reversal on first subsequent day, indicating a delayed price discovery effect from the price limit policy. Our results provide strong evidence that net buying (selling) has significantly predictive power for price limit hitting stocks' return (particularly for regular stocks) in subsequent days in both markets. 
